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SOME ASPECTS OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
FREDERICK G. McKEAN*
Judicial discretion is one of the most important elements of judicial power.
Without it judges would be reduced to automatons or robots and become creatures
of routine rather than magistrates; while law itself would petrify into a system
of inflexible dogmas and cease to be a social science. In view of its importance,
many attempts have been made to define this legal concept, the classic definition
being that of Lord Mansfield, who concluded that "Discretion when applied to
a Court of Justice, means sound Discretion guided by Law. It must not be arbitrary,
vague and fanciful, but legal and regular."' A more terse and succinct phrasing
is that of Jessel, M. R., who declared that "a judicial discretion *** means a dis-
cretion founded on sufficient reasons.''2 The factual influence is stressed in a
more modern opinion which states that judicial discretion is "a legal discretion
founded upon conditions which call for judicial action as distinguished from mere
individual personal view or desire." s Chief Justice Marshall's dictum that judicial
discretion is one employed "in discerning the courses prescribed by law,"4 expresses
the office of the subject of these notes, in terms of its objective. Professor Kan-
torowicz contributes an interesting observation by suggesting that: "Discretion
is not opposed to rules as is usually said; it is an intuitive way of finding rules:
'those inarticulate major premises,' which must be general if they are to serve as
major premises for judicial decisions." 5 Those who have studied the evolution
of the equitable concept of "conscience", may notice a very interesting parallelism
with the subject of this paper, insofar as both must be grounded upon some law and
must be supported by evidence and reason!6 At the same time, it is a matter of
every-day observation that appellate courts lean toward supporting the decisions
of lower courts, even when the ratio decidendi is deemed erroneous, wherever the
results are considered correct, and customarily will decline to reverse on the ground
of error, unless such error is material, and, in addition, is harmful in its results.
*LL.B., Harvard University, 1897; Judge of District Court of Virgin Islands of United
States, 1920-1924; Member of Pennsylvania Bar; Contributor to numerous legal periodicals.
IRex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 2539 (Eng. 1770).
2
1n re Durham, 16 Ch. D. 623, 635 (Eng. 1881).
SMatter of Superintendent of Banks, 207 N. Y. 11, 15 (1912).
4Osborn v. The Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 866 (U. S. 1824).
5Kantorowicz, Some Rationalism about Realism, 1934 Yale L. Journ. 1240, 1244.
(The cognate subject of the solution of jural problems in jurisdictions where applicable precedents
are lacking, has been discussed in my paper, "The Law of Laws" 1930 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 950).
GCf. McKean, Canon Law in American Jurisdictions, 1935 Dickinson L. Rev. 74, 84-87.
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Consequently, an exercise of discretion which is not unreasonable will not be deem-
ed reversible although the members of the upper court should be of the opinion
that the power might have been exercised in a more judicious fashion than that
which had been employed by the tribunal whose action is reviewed., Of course
dubbing an exercise of discretion "not unreasonable" is "damning it with faint
praise", for it does not imply unqualified approval; but, after all, it is better for
the satisfactory administration of justice according to law that a correct decision
of a case be sustained despite unprejudicial errors, than that needless pedantry
should protract litigation in an instant case and entail consequent delay which might
occasion the infliction of irreparable injury. "Time is of the essence of modern
life."
"Sound legal discretion", is the phrase frequently employed when approving
a ruling of a lower court. The expression imports guidance by law, reason and
evidence, and at the same time implies an appreciable latitude of choice of methods.
One class of guides comprises the constitutional maxims evolved from or recog-
nized in Magna Carta, and their derivatives developed in English-speaking countries,
such as the opportunity for a hearing and other principles epitomized in the preg-
nant phrase "due process of law". Another category embraces time-tested cos-
mopolitan principles grown up in jurisprudence such as cessante ratione legis,
cessat ipsa lex, and de minimis non curat lex. In short, judicial discretion must
be exercised in accordance with well-established rules of law;8 and should always
be employed in such manner as to subserve substantial justice so far as possible
under the circumstances of the cases in which it is applied. 9 Failure to meet with
these requisites constitutes that form of prejudicial error which is technically
phrased "abuse of discretion", (literally misuse or ill-use), denoting a transcend-
ing of the limits of sound discretion or a neglect of a duty to exercise the same.
The expression does not necessarily imply arbitrary, whimsical or capricious rul-
ings, but may import the overlooking or neglect of some vital factor apparent from
the record of a case or from judicially noted facts. It is suimised that the expres-
sion originated in the days when "abuse" signified "mistake". A courtly judge
in the Middle West feeling that the phrase is unnecessarily severe substitutes
the euphemism "judicial indiscretion". Very frequently an "abuse of discretion"
is the result of an effort to speed the progress of a sluggishly presented contro-
versy, and should be treated leniently, except where manifestly (or at the most
probably) injurious in contemplation of law. As a corollary to the familiar
7Mexican Central Railway Company v. Pinkney, 149 U. S. 194, 201 (1893) ; Bennett v. Bennett,
208 U. S. 505 (1908) ; Elzas v. Elzas, 183 Ill. 132 (1889) ; Fessenden v. Fessenden, 32 Ohio App.,
16, 19, 20 (1928); In re Durham, note 2 supra, at p. 639.
8National Theatres v. Foundation Film Corp., 266 Fed. 208, 210 (C. C. A. 2nd. 1920) ; Ever-
son v. Casualty Co. of America, 208 Mass. 214 (1911) ; Spofford v. Railway Co., 66 Me. 26, 48
(1876).
9Butler v. Strickland, 15 Ga. App. 193 (1914) ; De Forg v. Railroad Co., 178 Mass. 59 (190L).
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presumption that public officials do their duty, there is a rebuttable presumption
that trial courts exercise their legal discretion judiciously in the discharge of their
duties. It naturally follows that every reasonable intendment should be in favor
of such a presumption, for a trial court possesses first-hand knowledge of the
setting which furnishes an important part of the background of its rulings.
This principle is well illustrated by Stephens' rule to the effect that: Evidence may
be given in any proceeding of any fact in issue, and of any fact relevant to any
fact in issue, provided that the judge may, in his discretion, exclude evidence
of facts which though relevant, appear to him too remote to be material under
all the circumstances of the case.10
As previously remarked, a neglect or oversight of duty may be deemed an
abuse of discretion. For illustration, a failure to make a needed finding of
fundamental facts, or to make a proper deduction therefrom is accounted a fla-
grant abuse of discretion. 1 In short, judicial inertia is so discountenanced that
very frequently mandamus lies to compel the exercise of discretion.12 Were there
no such means of compelling the exercise of discretion, an important objective
of that function (which is the expediting of legal business), might be frustrated.
How else could trial courts be required to hear and determine cases? At the same
time, it is almost self-evident that mandamus does not extend to controlling the
discretion of courts in matters in which no tribunal could intelligently dictate to
or even advise another.13 Courts of justice have inherent power to keep the trial
of issues within due bounds, consistent with the demands of justice and fair
play, and thus avoid the social mischief of protracted litigation straying into remote
by-paths and cluttering up a record with immaterial or unnecessarily cumulative
matter. This inherent power gives rise to a judicial duty to keep the course of a
trial firmly in hand and to halt irrelevant digression. Inasmuch as it is practically
impossible to formulate precise general rules which do not admit of circumvention
or evasion, the performance of such duty is of necessity entrusted in a considerable
degree to the good sense of the trial judge. In other words, courts as agencies
of organized society are charged with an imperative obligation to conduct their
business with reasonable efficiency and dispatch, and the powers entrusted to them
in order that they may effect this purpose, necessarily authorize the judicious
lORailway Co. v. Hall, 232 U. S. 94 (1914); Earl v. Times-Mirror Co., 185 Cal. 165 (1926);
State v. Isaacson, 114 Conn. 567, (1932); Gas Company v. Smith, 109 Md. 186 (1909); Reed v.
Nashua Buick Co., 84 N. H. 156 (1929); accord.
11Foy's Election, 228 Pa. 14, 19, 20 (1910).
12Ex parte Bradsteet, 7 Peters 634, 650 (U. S. 1833) ; In re Burtis, 13 Otto 238 (U. S. 1881);
Hudson v. Parker, 156 U. S. 277, 288, (1895); Ex parte Wagner, 249 U. S. 465, 471 (1919) ; San
Joaquin v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. 602 (1893) ; State v. Judges, 34 La. Ann. 1114 (1882) ; King
v. Justices, 4 Ad. & El. 695 (Eng. 1836); Queen v. Deputies, 15 Q. B. 671, 674 (Eng. 1850); Queen
v. Brown, 7 El. & B. 757 (Eng. 1857).
laIn re Parsons, Petitioner, 150 U. S. 150 (1893).
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employment of appropriate means requisite for the attainment of this objective.
It is thus apparent that procedure, "the machinery of the law as distinguished
from its product", is an important element of the jurisdiction of a case, which
latter "consists in the right to hear and determine it, and embraces, not only its
merits, but the proceedings which are necessary to enable the court possessing such
jurisdiction to bring it to a final determination". 14 Where a court of justice has
exercised its discretion, or estimation of the circumstances, in procedural matters,
such as: motions for change of venue; 15 the revisions or setting aside of orders
before a jury is sworn or a judgment given;16 postponement of a trial;"7 amendment
of pleadings;18 rulings upon challenge of a juror; 19 order of proof;20 determin-
ation of the competency of a witness;21 rulings on evidence;2 2 regulation of the
manner and extent of cross-examination; 23 re-opening of a case to receive additional
evidence;24 or the amendment or alteration of a record;25 the discretion involved
is deemed so wide that it will not be questioned by an upper court, except where
found to be clearly and palpably opposed to reason, improperly exercised, or
violative of established law governing the rights of the parties.
Somewhat similar principles regulate the right to a grant or refusal of
extraordinary remedies such as mandamus or quo warranto. Mandamus lies where
a duty sought to be enforced is plain and non-discretionary and the situation ex-
igent.26 As applied to courts, this category includes such cases as breach of duty
to take jurisdiction, and hear and determine a cause of action;27 or failure to
proceed with a hearing.28 Generally speaking, the grant or refusal of a writ
of mandamus is regarded as discretionary as distinguished from a writ of right.
This is not an absolute discretion, but one regulated and controlled by legal rules;
and while exercise of such discretion is reviewable, 29 an appellate court cannot,
by writ of mandamus, compel a court below to decide a matter before it in a
14Sanford v. Sanford, 28 Conn. 6, 14 (1859) Storrs, C. J.
15State v. Mooney, 10 Iowa 506 (1860).
16Breedlove v. Nicolet, 7 Pet. 413, 432 (U. S. 1833).
17Winklemeir v. Daiber, 92 Mich. 621 (1892).
1sRyan v. Scanlon, 117 Conn. 428, 435 (1933).
19Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 248 (1910).
20Jarvis v. Bell, 296 Pa. 568, 576 (1929).
21Dickson v. Waldron, 135 Ind. 507 (1893).
22Gas Company v. Smith, 109 Md. 186 (1909).
23Ripley v. Taft, 253 Mass. 490 (1925).
2 4Central Nat. Bank v. National Metropolitan Bank, 31 App. D. C. 391, 17 L. R. A. (N. S,)
520 (1908).
25Nelson v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 314 Pa. 27 (1934).
2 6Lane v. Hoglund, 244 U. S. 174 (1917).
27Queen v. Brown, note 12 supra.
28King v. Justices, note 12 supra.
29 Gas Light Co. v. Common Council, 78 N. Y. 56 (1879); 6 Bac. Abridgment, (E) p. 443
(1876 Amer. ed.).
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
particular way.30 Employing variant phraseology, the writ lies to enforce a
ministerial duty (one in which nothing is left to discretion) where there is a clear
legal right; but not to dictate a course of discretion, although such a writ may
lie to compel an exercise of discretion. 31 Outside of these limits, courts empowered
to issue writs of mandamus have a discretion to refuse such a writ to compel the
doing of an idle act; to give a remedy which would work a public injury or em-
barrassment; or to enforce or protect legal rights, the exercise of which may be
prejudicial to the public interest.3 2 So equitable are the principles involved in
dealing with this important form of process, that it has been accounted a writ
"of grace".,3  It follows that mandamus will not issue where there is doubt of its
necessity or propriety;3 4 will be refused where laches in applying for it is deemed
to be of controlling weight; 35 and will not be granted unless and until a plain-
tiff has established that its issuance is requisite and necessary to secure the ends
of justice or to subserve some just and legal purpose.36 Here, as well as in all
other situations which call for the exercise of magisterial power, border-line cases
require careful discernment of the difference between matters of substance and
"colorable glosses".
Today the purview of most ancient common law writs, including the writ
of quo warranto or action in the nature of a quo warranto, is largely governed
by considerations of public policy and by the statutory limitations of local legisla-
tion. The prototype of such enactments anent quo warranto is the famous statute
9 Anne, c. 20, (1710), which has been set forth in extenso in Judge Roberts' ad-
mirable compilation, British Statutes in Pennsylvania; and is deemed to be of such
practical importance that many commentators have discussed the act referred to,
when dealing with its derivatives. As a general proposition, an award or refusal
of quo warranto rests in the sound discretion of a court empowered to issue such
a writ; and judgment thereon will be affirmed unless there is an unmistakable
abuse of discretion.3 7 Among the factors accounted worthy of consideration when
exercising discretion in dealing with this form of remedy are public policy;38
301n re Parsons, Petitioner, note 13 supra.
31Hudson v. Parker, 156 U. S. 277, 288 (1895) ; San Joaquin v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. 602
(1893).
82United States v. Derr, 289 U. S. 352, 360 (1933).
SsSimonton v. City of Pontiac, 255 N. W. 608, 613 (Mich. 1934).
3 41ndependent Brewing Co. v. Colonial Trust Co., 273 Pa. 12 (1922).
3 5 State v. Myers, 128 Ohio St. 568 (1934).
SGTolbert v. Railroad Company, 126 Md. 569 (1915).
8 ?People v. People's Gas Light Co., 205 111. 482 (1903) ; State v. School District No. 10, 85
Minn. 230 (1902); State v. Nohle, 16 N. D. 168 (1907); Com. v. Arrison, 15 S. & R. 127 (Pa.
1827); Cum. v. Sommer, 309 Pa. 447 (1932); Watkins v. Venable, 99 Va. 440 (1901); State v.
McGeary, 69 Vt. 461 (1897).
3sMarian v. Beard, 259 Mich. 183 (1932).
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the nature of the interest of a relator; 89 equities, such as laches or fraud; 0 and the
balance of convenience or injury.
4 '
The exceedingly important branch of the law of remedies, which is known
in our system of law as equity jurisprudence, has this in common with the law of
extraordinary remedies--that, as a general rule, it is only available in cases where
the form of relief sought is a sine qua non to the procurement of adequate redress. 42
For the most part, "equitable remedies are administered in accordance with rules
as certain as human wisdom can devise, leaving their application only in doubtful
cases to the discretion***of the chancellor."4 3  One of the most important of
equitable remedies is the writ of injunction whose origin, according to Lord
Bathurst, is attributable to an extension of the writ of prohibition of Waste. 4
It is sometimes classed with the category of extraordinary remedies. The trans-
cendent powers of this drastic remedy are not to be used heedlessly, oppressively,
capriciously or improvidently;"5 where there is a complete remedy at law by which
an injury can be fully compensated in damages;46 or where there is merely con-
sequential and incidental injury. 47 On the other hand, the remedy is not to be
denied whenever essential to protect property rights or the rights of persons against
irreparable injury; 48 which is emphatically the case wherever no certain pecuniary
standards exist for the measurement of unlawful damage done or threatened. 49
39 People v. Healy, 230 Il. 280 (1907); State v. Cairns. 305 Mo. 333 (1924).
40State v. School District No. 10, note 37, supra; Com. v. Turnpike Co., 153 Pa. 47 (1893).
4lWatkins v. Venable, note 37 supra.
421t is believed that there is no need to discuss exceptional situations where courts of law and
equity have coordinate jurisdiction otherwise than by referring to the case of Driscoll v. Smith, 184
Mass. 221 (1903), which reminds us that where an action of law lies, but the remedy would not be
as practical and efficient as in equity, it is not adequate.
43
Walters v. McElroy, 151 Pa. 549, 557 (1892).
44 Goodeson v. Gallatin, 2 Dick. 455 (Eng. 1771).
46Frost v. City, 181 Cal. 22; Milton Dairy Co. v. Gt. Northern Ry. Co., 124 Minn. 239 (19t 1);
Attorney General v. Crown Laundry Service Inc., 116 N. J. Eq. 40 (1934); Stamp v. Board of
Supervisors, 252 N. Y. Supp, 303 (1931); Chartiers Block Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286 (1893);
Becker v. Lebanon St. Ry. Co., 188 Pa. 484 (1898) ; Funk v. Inland Power & Light Co., I Pac. (2d)
872 (Wash. 1931).
46 Winslow v. Fleischner, 110 Ore. 554, 563 (1924) ; Turnkpike Road v. Steam Company, 5 Pa.
Co. Ct. 354 (1888).
4 7 Moore v. City, 70 Ga. 611, 615 (1883) ; Elliott Nursery Co. v. Duquesne Light Co., 281 Pa.
166, 177 (1924).
4 8 Champton Refg. Co. v. Commission, 286 U. S. 210, 238 (1932); Mobile & 0. Ry. Co. v.
Zimmern, 206 Ala. 37 (1921); Baldocchi v. Four-Fifty Sutter Corporation, 18 Pac. (2d) 682 (Cal.
1933) ; Schavoir v. Leather Co., 104 Conn. 472 (1926) ; Banby v. Kraskow, 107 Conn. 109 (19,17);
Dick v. Sears-Roebuck Co., 115 Conn. 122 (1932) ; Nat. Ins. Co. of the U. S. v. Myers, 140 I11. App.
392 (1908) ; Summerfield Co. v. Prime Furniture Co., 242 Mass. 149 (1922); Doane v. Allen, 172
Mich. 686 (1912) ; Ruty v. Huelsenbeck, 109 N. J. Eq. 273 (1931) ; Hard v. Blue Points Co., 156
N. Y. Supp. 465 (1915).
4 9Cleveland v. Martin, 218 Ill. 73, 87 (1905) ; Philadelphia Ball Club Inc. v. Lajoie, .202 Pa.
210, 216 (1902).
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Within these limits the granting or withholding of the remeay of injunction is
seldom a matter of absolute right, and is usually a matter of "grace" or discre-
tion. 50 To a considerable extent the exercise of this function of discretion is based
upon fact findings, much of which may be intuitive or inarticulate, but none the
less sound. Naturally we find that the discretion of a trial court in granting or
dissolving an interlocutory injunction will not be interfered with by an appellate
court except upon a showing of palpable abuse. 51 When it comnws to the mould-
ing of decrees in injunctive proceedings, the general objective of equity is "to use
practical precautions" to protect a plaintiff against positive and wrongful invasion
of his rights by a defendant, without curbing lawful activity on the part of the
defendant.62 Frequently this is best achieved by a process of "reasoning from
life," in preference to a priori reasoning from abstract conception. An excellent
illustration of judicious employment of practical precautions, wherein sound dis-
cretion was exercised is afforded by the case of Schwartzenbach v. Oneonta Light
& Power Co.55 In that case there was damage caused by the overflow of land, due
to the dam of the defendant company. On the one hand, there was presented
a question of public safety, for surely, to mention only one of many perils,
a community shrouded in darkness would be an Ailsatia for criminals. On the
other side there jutted the consideration that a flooding of land is a taking there-
of. 54 The equities were balanced by granting an injunction against the trespass
and suspending the enforcement of the writ for a fixed period of time within
which the defendant could have an opportunity of abating the injury. Discretion
as to the grant of injunctions is exercised in accordance with established law and
rules of equity;55 is guided by the substantiality of the interest sought to be pro-
tected;56 will frequently lead to a refusal of the relief petitioned for, where
such equities as an innocent mistake of the defendant or laches on the part of a
plaintiff are involved, or where the conduct of the defendant is not unconscion-
able;57 and, will sometimes be guided by considerations of the balance of con-
venience or of injury.
58
It is often the case that judges attach different weights to competitive prin-
ciples which cannot, as yet, be weighed in any definite scale. This phenomenon
is frequently the cause of dissenting opinions, as well as those which commentators
50Meccano Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, 253 U. S. 136 (1920); Vulcan Detinning Co. v. St. Clair,
315 Ill. 40 (1924); Strobeck v. McWilliams, 42 N. D. 30 (1919).
51Furniture Manufacturer's Assn. of Grand Rapids v. Grand Rapids Guild of Exhibitors, 268
Mich. 685 (1934).
S2Summerfield Co. v. Prime Furniture Co., note 48 supra.
51129 N. Y. Supp. 384 (1911), modified in 207 N. Y. 671 (1912).
54Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U. S. 166, 178 (1871).
S6United States v. Republic Oil Co., 8 Fed. Supp. 897 (D. N. J. 1934).
56Dick v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., note 48 supra, at page 127.
57Banby v. Krasow, note 48 supra, at page 115.
5SOntjes v. Bagley, 250 N. W. 17, 20 (Iowa 1933).
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designate as "contra". Sometimes these differences are occasioned by different
concepts of public policy. It is conceivable that a passing fad, or the propaganda
of an aggressive bloc, may be mistaken for an enlargement of the boundaries of'
knowledge; and, on the other hand, there may be a failure to recognize a change
in social or physical conditions which demands application of the time-tested
rule of logic, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. Sometimes the heresy of yester-
day becomes the orthodoxy of today, and, conversely the orthodoxy of yesteryear,
becomes "the fighting faith" of the present.
Since the time of its introduction into Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, the remedy
of specific performance of contracts, has ordinarily been treated as a question of dis-
cretion, whether it is advisable to interfere and give a remedy unknown to the com-
mon law, or whether it would be more judicious to remit the parties to the assertion
of their rights in a court of common law.5 9 This form of relief is not demandable
as an absolute right; but its grant or refusal rests entirely in sound judicial dis-
cretion limited, of course, by other principles of equity with especial reference to the
circumstances of the particular case so as to avoid unnecessary harshness or oppres-
sion.60 The limitations imposed by established usage, just referred to, must be
honored wherever a reign of law is deemed wiser and more wholesome than an
attempted beneficent despotism. An important consideration established by equ it-
able principle and usage is the position of the plaintiff. Accordingly he will not
be granted a decree unless he, the party seeking relief, can do complete justice,61
nor will a petitioner for specific performance of a contract be given an advantage
tor which he had not bargained62 Likewise it would be considered an unwarrant-
able exercise of discretionary power to overlook laches63 or any other equities
which might lead a chancellor to the belief that injustice might be done by the
grant of a decree of specific performance.6 4 At the same time it must not be over-
looked that when it appears that a valid contract has been entered into, is in its
nature and circumstance, not unreasonable, and an action for damages would not
insure adequate relief, a decree of specific performance will be of course, and not
merely of grace.65 Furthermore, in the absence of evidence to the contrary appear-
ing of record, it will be presumed that a decree of specific performance, if rendered.
59Scott v. Alvarez [1895) 2 Ch. 603, 615. (Eng.).
6 OHaffner v. Dobrinski, 215 U. S. 446 (1910); Anderson v. Anderson, 75 Kan. 117, 123
(1907); Offutt v. Offutt, 106 Md. 236, 241 (1907); Banaghan v. Malaney, 200 Mass. 46, 49
(1906) ; Bartley v. Lindabury, 89 N. J. Eq. 8 (1918) ; Ramsay v. Gheen, 99 N. C. 215 (1888):
Friend v. Lamb, 152 Pa. 529, 533 (1893) ; Humphrey v. Brown, 291 Pa. 53, 60 (1927).
61Omerod v. Hardman, 5 Ves. Jr. 722, 734 (Eng. 1801) ; Calhoun v. Brewster, 1 N. B. Eq.
Rep. 529, 534 (Can. 1898).
62Rees v. Marquis of Bute, [1916) 2 Ch. 64, 74 (Eng.).
6SSchulter v. Gentilly Terrace Co., 164 La. 663 (1927).
,4 Humphrey v. Brown, 291 Pa. 53, 60 (1927); Barrett v. Forney, 82 Va. 269 (1886); Rai.
liffe v. Warrington, 12 Ves. Jr. 326, 334 (Eng. 1806).
S6Anderson v. Anderson, 251 Ii. 415 (1911) ;Hall v. Warren, 9 Ves. Jr. 605, 608 (Eng. 1811).
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was granted not arbitrarily, but under the exercise of sound, reasonable judicial
discretion. 66 And, as is probably the case with all situations which arise for the
exercise of a court's discretion, while the grant or refusal of specific performance
must not work injustice, at the same time it should not be violative of accepted
analogies, 67 and at all times should "discern" **between shadow and substance."
68
Toward the end of the last century, the father of the case-system of teaching
law found, as the result of painstaking and brilliant research that the equitable
remedy of "discovery is not an original product of English soil. Its name, indeed,
is English but the thing itself is entirely foreign. It was borrowed by the Court ot
Chancery, directly from the English ecclesiastical courts-indirectly from the civil
and canon law."6 9 A bill of discovery is of grace or discretion and not of course;
otherwise it could be availed of as an engine of oppressive inquisition or be utilized
as a probe to gratify the impertinent curiosity of the gossip, or the unscrupulous
inquisitiveness of the blackmailer or unfair competitor.70 At least so far back as
the year 1415 the House of Commons protested against the examination and oath of
parties to litigation in equity as being in accord with "the form of the civil law and
the Law of Holy Church in subversion of the common law." 7 1 These protests were
renewed from time to time, and made such deep impression upon students of Eng-
lish law that the framers of American Constitutions have been careful to include
guarantees that the papers of citizens should be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures. "It is contrary to the first principles of justice to allow a search through
* * * records relevant or irrelevant in the hope that something will turn up," said
the late Mr. Justice Holmes speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States.7z
While chancellors are vested with wide discretionary powers as to the grant or re-
fusal of discovery,73 it is fairly obvious that they are in duty bound to exercise such
inquisitorial powers with great caution. They may refuse the remedy for reasons
of State, 74 or because the defendant is a bona fide purchaser, 75 will refuse to permit
"fishing",76 but, in proper cases, will assist a plaintiff to obtain material evidence
66King v. Gsanter, 23 Neb. 795, 801 (1888).
67Cf. Cases cited in note 60 supra. Cf. also, Shimer v. Morris Canal & Banking Co., 27 N. J.
Eq. 364; Goring v. Nash, 3 Atk. 186 (Eng. 1744) ; Burgen v. Wheat, I Eden, 177, 214 (Eng. 1759);
Scott v. Alvarez, note 59, supra.
6sCf.: Cruthers v. Donahue, 85 Conn. 629 (1912) ; Willey v. Bowden, 14 Ga. App. 37,:
(1914); State v. McGeary, 69 Vt. 461 (1897).
69Langdell, Discovery under the Judicature Acts, 1897 Harv. L. Rev. 137, 138.
70Cf.: Wesley v. Eells, 177 U. S. 370 (1900); Cullison v. Bossom, I Md. Ch. 95 (1847) ; Rey.
nolds v. Burgess Sulphite Fibre Co., 71 N. H. 332 (1902).
71Rot. Part. 84 (3 Hen. V, pt. 2, 46, No, 23)-Holmes' translation. (This objection is said to
have been pressed with great frequency, according to I Bouvier L. Dict. 1058 (3d ed.) ).
72Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Company, 264 U. S. 298, 306 (1924).
73 Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleuin Process Co., 289 U. S. 689, 696, 697 (1933).
4
Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487 (1872).
"SZollman v. Moore, 62 Va. 318 (1871); Pilcher v. Rawlins, L. R. 7 Ch. 259, 269" (Eng. 1872).
7 6Cullison v. Bossom. note 70 supra; Town of Franklin v. Crane, 80 N. J. Eq, 509 (1912);
D'Wolf v. D'Wolf, 4 R. I. 450 (1850).
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relevant to his own case.7 7 The process is classed as auxiliary, but it is surmised
that there may be occasions when counsel erriploy it as a tactical move toward forc-
ing settlement by an obstinate opponent. Equality is equity, consequently a chancel-
lor, within the limitations imposed by law and equity, is fully empowered to probe
the conscience of a defendant as to withheld evidentiary matters relevant to the
plaintiff's case, provided that due care is taken to avoid inquiry into matters pertain-
ing to the case of the defendant. 78 To a considerable extent, the balance of conven-
ience or of injury, is an important factor to be considered when exercising discretion
as to the grant or refusal of discovery.7" In a few words, an award or denial of this
powerful and important remedy rests upon settled principles of equity; and while
in the sound discretion of a chancellor a decree of discovery may issue in aid of a
legal or equitable claim or defense, it will never be granted in opposition to posi-
tive law or equity.
It may have been observed that the subject of these notes is often a considerable
tax upon the powers of observation and discernment of a judge or chancellor, no
matter in what branch of jurisprudence it may arise. Further demonstration of this
fact may be found in pursuing its applicability to the equitable remedy of the cancel-
lation and rescission of instruments and agreements. In this class of cases, a, prayer
for relief is addressed to "the equitable consideration" of a court 80 and when
granted as legitimate relief, the decree is based upon the ancient principle quia
timel,81 not as a matter of absolute right ex debito justitiae, but in the discretion of
the court, "guided by principles which have been evolved in the course of adjudica-
tion." 82 An important principle which has grown up in general jurisprudence is
the practice of civilized courts of justice to intervene, whenever the balance of jus-
tice is disturbed by wrong-doing or by the threat of it, and restore, as far as possible
the status quo.83 In accordance with this fundamental principle, the conscience of
a chancellor is opposed to granting the cancellation or rescission of agreements or
other instruments where the parties cannot be placed in statu quo; unless, in his
estimation of the circumstances (commonly termed conscience or discretion), such
a remedy be demanded by clear and strong equity.84 It naturally follows that the
relief of rescission, cancellation and delivery up of deeds or agreements, is not a
77Reynolds v. Burgess Sulphite Fibre Co., note 70 supra; Hurricane Telephone Co. v. Mohler,
51 W. Va. 1 (1902); Lyell v. Kennedy, 8 App. Cas. 217, 224 (1883).
7 8 Lesser v. Henry, 50 Pa. Super Ct. 440 (1912); Hurricane Telephone Co. v. Mohler, note
77 supra; Lyell v. Kennedy, note 77 supra.
7 9 Sinclair Refining Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., note 73 supra at page 700 (semble);
Star Kidney Pad Co. v. Greenwood, 3 Ont, 280 (Can. 1883).
80Swan v. Talbot, 152 Cal. 142 (1907).
81Fred Macy Co. v. Macy, 143 Mich. 138 (1906); 2 Story Eq. Jur. 93 (14th ed. 1918).
82 Calhoun v. Millard, 121 N. Y. 69 (1890).
8SHolland, Jurisprudence, 320 (lth ed. 1910).
84Fink v. Farmers' Bank, 178 Pa. 154 (1896) ; Larivere v. Larocque, 105 Vt. 460 (1933)
Long v. Inhabitants of Athol, 196 Mass. 497 (1907)
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matter of absolute right, but is within the sound discretion of the court to be care-
fully exercised in granting or refusing the relief prayed for, in accordance with what
is reasonable and proper under the circumstances of the particular case.8s And such
action may be based upon extrinsic evidence86 But where a question of unconstitu-
tionality presents itself, there is authority for remitting the controversy to an action
at law, in view of the public or governmental interest involved.8 7 In brief, it is the
constant endeavor of chancellors to permit no party to have an inequitable advan-
tage; 88 and an important element which is frequently taken into consideration, is
the equitable principle, "he who seeks equity must do equity."89
In the performance of a duty of exercising an inherent or conferred power of
discretion, there are three points to which the attention of a court of justice may
be directed. In the first place, it must not transcend the limitations imposed by rules
of law or usage, or equitable principles, as the case may be, which define the scope
of its freedom of judgment and action.90 Secondly, the power must be exercised
to an end justified by (or at least not opposed to) reason and evidence. 91 Thirdly,
it must not be so exercised as to occasion injustice. 92 .
All of which amounts to this, that the discretion of a trial court is circum-
scribed by well-established rules, principles and usages; and its exercise will not be
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